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Abstract
This paper considers the relationship that exists between two lottery products offered
simultaneously in the same state, a smaller lottery game run by the individual state and a larger
multi-state game run in coordination with other states.  The primary issue is whether the two
different products should be considered substitutes or complements for one another.  The
question is considered from two different perspectives that lead to a conclusion that while the
two products do tend to be complements to one another, overall the individually run state lottery
games experience a reduction in sales from the presence of the multi-state game.
JEL Classification Codes:  D81, H71, L83
Keywords: lotto, lottery, public finance  3
Introduction 
 
  While national, state, and local governments offer a variety of legalized gambling 
products through lottery associations, among the most popular, and the focus of this study, is the 
set of games known as “lotto,” where players select five or six numbers from among 35 to 55 
choices (depending on the structure of the game) and win prizes based on the numbers that are 
correctly matched in a weekly or bi-weekly drawing. A ticket buyer(s) who matches all of the 
numbers wins the jackpot prize pool while players matching some but not all of the winning 
numbers win smaller consolation prizes. In most games, if the jackpot prize is not won in a 
particular drawing, the money allocated to the jackpot is carried over into the next drawing and is 
added to funds from ticket sales in the next period. Because the jackpot prize fund is allowed to 
roll-over in this manner, the jackpot prize can become quite large if no one hits the jackpot in a 
number of successive periods. Indeed, advertised jackpots exceeding $50 million are quite 
common, and occasionally lotto jackpots have been known to exceed $250 million. 
  As of June 2005, 40 states had government run lotteries. Each of those states offered 
some version of a lotto game either through an individually run statewide game or through a 
multi-state association such as the twenty-seven state Multi-State Lottery Association 
(Powerball) or the eleven state Big Game/Mega-Millions association.  While the prizes, odds, 
structures, ticket costs, drawing dates, and other elements of the game all differ across the 
various games, they are all similar in that they offer the opportunity to potentially turn a one 
dollar ticket into millions of dollars of winnings (albeit with a very low probability.)  It is likely 
the attraction of “making it big” combined with the ease of participation in such games that 
entices people to take part in this nationwide activity.  Added to that, the proceeds from state 
lottery ticket sales go into the financing of public projects and programs (often times earmarked   4
for specific purposes), making lottery tickets a more “conscientious” choice for some gamblers 
than privately run casinos and race tracks. Several authors have questioned, however, whether 
earmarked lottery funds do serve to increase spending for the designated area. See Novarro 
(2005). 
  In the 1970s and 1980s, lottery associations began to experiment with the idea that by 
offering games with longer odds but bigger grand-prizes, they could attract more buyers. Forrest, 
et al, (2002) have suggested that lotto players are attracted by the high jackpots and not the 
expected return, and lotto is popular due to the “skewness” of the bet rather than its expected 
return. Lottery associations realized, however, that if the odds were too high, jackpots would be 
won very infrequently, and, therefore, the games would not benefit from frequent media 
exposure surrounding jackpot winners. Lottery officials were forced to choose between offering 
games with high jackpots and ones with frequent winners. 
  To this end, in the mid 1970s, state and provincial lottery associations began to join 
together to offer lotto games beginning with the formation of the Western Canada Lottery 
Corporation in 1974, the Tri-State Lotto, joining Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, in 1985, 
the Multi-State Lottery Corporation (now more commonly known as Powerball) in 1988, and the 
Big Game/Mega-Millions Association in 1996. By merging games, states could offer larger 
jackpots, but the increased number of players would assure that the grand prize was won on a 
regular basis.  
Clotfelter and Cook (1993) suggest that the optimal (or at least most frequent) odds to 
population ratio for lotto games in the early 1990s was roughly 1. That is, a lottery association 
serving a population base of 13 million could offer a game with odds of roughly 1 in 13 million 
and maintain a reasonable frequency of jackpot winners. Until the early 2000s, this meant that   5
states with smaller populations generally offered lotto by being a member of one of the two 
major multi-state games (Powerball and Big Game/Mega-Millions) while more populous states 
could offer high prizes through independent lotto games. For example, as of January 2000, eight 
states (CA, TX, NY, FL, PA, OH, WA, and CO) operated lotto games but not did belong to a 
multi-state game. Of these eight states, six ranked among the seven largest states by population. 
By the early 2000s, however, perhaps due to the record $250 million plus jackpots 
offered during several Powerball and Mega-Millions drawings, even these hold-out states began 
to join in the multi-state associations so that by September 2004, only Florida and California 
remained independent from any multi-state lotto game. Similarly, the national lottery 
associations of the UK, France and Spain have joined together to offer EuroMillions, which 
promises to offer among the highest jackpots in Europe. 
Lottery associations face numerous questions when posed with the option to join a multi-
state lottery. Essentially the choice is whether to join the multi-state game, offer an independent 
game, or sell tickets to both an independent game and the multi-state lotto game.  The particular 
focus of this paper is the nature of the relationship between individual state-run games and the 
larger multi-state lotto games and whether they tend to be complements to or substitutes for one 
another. 
The issue of complements/substitutes among lottery games is not new to the literature.  
Clotfelter and Cook (1989) test the effects of introducing lotto games on the sales of scratch-card 
tickets.  Stover (1990) finds significant substitution effects between lotteries run by contiguous 
states.  Gulley and Scott (1993), in part of a larger paper, consider the question of whether the 
two state lotto games in Massachuesetts, the Mass Millions and Mass Megabucks games, serve 
as substitutes for one another, finding no significant relationship between the two.  Forrest, Gully   6
and Simmons (2004) find evidence of some substitution among the variety of games offered by 
the United Kingdom National Lottery.  Along the lines of these studies, this paper also attempts 
to answer the question of whether the various lottery products on the market are interrelated, but 
the focus will be on the relationship between multi-state lottery products and those offered by 
individual states in the states that offer both to their constituents. 
 
Substitutes vs. Complements  
The issue of whether multi-state and state lottery products are substitutes or complements 
to one another is perhaps not so straightforward as examining the lottery products of two 
different states as in Stover (1990).  The lottery products of two different states are obviously in 
competition with one another as the states try to attract ticket buyers to their games and away 
from the products of the neighboring states in order to increase state revenues.  When the multi-
state games of Powerball and Big Game/Mega Millions are considered next to the individually-
run state games, however, the sense of competition is not nearly as strong since revenues from 
the ticket sales of Powerball and Mega Millions also stay within the state that sold it (both in 
form of revenue to the store that sold the ticket and to the state government that sponsors the 
game).  Therefore, why concern one’s self with whether the multi-state game is a substitute for a 
smaller state-run game or a complement to that game?  Either way, the revenues from the games 
stay within that state, unlike when there are competing games from different states. 
The reason for concern can be clarified by considering the purpose of offering a state 
lottery game in the first place.  The games are offered to provide revenues to the state 
governments.  If the games serve as substitutes for one another, then the increased sales in the 
multi-state game are offset (at least partially) by lower sales in the state game.  If the two games   7
serve as complements to one another, however, then ticket buyers increase purchases in the state 
game as the purchases rise in the multi-state game, and there are benefits from running the two 
games simultaneously. 
How is it possible that lottery games could be either substitutes or complements to one 
another?  If we were looking at two separate games where tickets were sold at different locations 
as in Stover (1990), there would be little question that the different games would be substitutes 
for one another.  Ticket buyers would take their limited budgets devoted to ticket purchases and 
spend them where the expected return was higher (or effective ticket price was lower), after 
accounting for transaction costs.  Since the tickets would have to be bought in different locations, 
there are no complementarities in the competing lotteries of different states. 
However, while the potential for substitution between a multi-state and single state game 
still exists for a state that belongs to a multi-state association, there is also the possibility of 
complements arising as tickets can now be bought at the same store/location.  Thus, as the larger 
multi-state jackpot rises to levels that the smaller state jackpots rarely (if ever) reach, consumers 
may buy tickets not only for the multi-state game from their local vendor but also for the local 
state game as well. This can be explained fairly easily through the consideration of transaction 
costs, expected returns, and consumer behavior. The relatively lower potential winnings from 
purchasing a smaller state lottery ticket may not be high enough to compel a potential buyer to 
go out and purchase a lottery ticket. However, the excitement generated by the substantially 
higher jackpots advertised in the multi-state games may be enough to attract ticket buyers to 
lottery vendors and also allows the consumer to overcome any psychological barriers to 
gambling. Once this occurs, the multi-state lottery ticket buyer may also indulge in the purchase 
of the small state lottery game as well.    8
In a similar way, one might ask whether slot machines and table games at a casino are 
complements or substitutes. Suppose a particular casino is known for having particularly “loose” 
slots, that is their slot machines pay a high expected return. Certainly that casino would take 
business away from other neighborhood casinos just like lotto products from different states 
compete with one another. However, what would happen to revenue at the blackjack table within 
the casino with the loose slots?  Would table revenue fall as casino patrons are lured away to slot 
machines, or would casino revenue rise as the loose slots lure new gamblers into the casino who 
then spend some portion of the time playing table games? It is this potential conflict of 
substitutes versus complements for competing lotto games offered within the same state that is 
examined in this paper.  
 
Gross Effect on State Lotto Sales as a Result of Joining a Multi-State Game 
The first question to be addressed is how the sales level of a state-run lotto game is 
affected once a state becomes a member of a larger multi-state game like Powerball or Mega 
Millions.  Although this particular question is not directly correlated with the issue of whether 
the multi-state game is a complement or substitute for the state-run game according to the strict 
definitions of the two terms, it can provide an indication of how ticket buyers as a group respond 
to the additional (and larger jackpot) game, and particularly how that response affects the sales 
revenues of the smaller game. 
The most obvious way to examine the gross effects of joining a multi-sate lottery would 
be to compare ticket sales from the state lotto game before the introduction of a new game to the 
combined ticket sales from both the state and multi-state lotto games after the adoption of a new 
game.  There are two limits to this approach, however.  First, state-by-state sales information for   9
the larger multi-state games is not available for all states, precluding this as a general 
methodology. Second, and more importantly, there are likely other variables affecting the sales 
of a state’s lottery tickets besides the presence of another lottery.  To isolate the marginal effect 
of the presence of a multi-state lottery on the sales of a state lottery game, regression analysis can 
be used.  In particular, one can determine the effect on the smaller game of the member lottery 
by regressing the sales for the game on a number of independent variables that should affect 
sales and including a dummy variable for the multi-state game once the state becomes a member.  
Once the marginal effect of the multi-state game on the state game is determined through 
regression analysis, the coefficient on the dummy variable can then be compared to the in-state 
sales generated by the multi-state game (where the data is available) to determine the net effect 
on sales revenues for the state. The equation used to estimate the effect of a multi-state games on 
state lotto ticket sales is shown in equation (1). 
 
(1)   Sales = β0 + β1(Jackpot) + β2(Jackpot)
2 + β3(Trend) + β4(Multi-state) + є 
(Note: time subscripts for each variable have been dropped for simplicity.)  
 
In addition to the Multi-state dummy variable, which takes on a value of 0 for drawings 
prior to becoming a multi-state game member and 1 thereafter, the advertised jackpot of the state 
game, advertised jackpot squared of the state game, and a time trend are also included in the first 
set of regressions.  Since the price of a lotto ticket and the odds of winning remain fixed 
regardless of the size of the jackpot, the expected return from the purchase of a lottery ticket   10
generally rises along with the size of the jackpot.
1 It is therefore natural to assume that ticket 
sales will increase along with the advertised jackpot.  “Jackpot squared” is also included as an 
explanatory variable to reflect the non-linear relationship between ticket sales and advertised 
jackpots.  In general, ticket sales are predicted to increase at an increasing rate relative to the 
advertised jackpot.  This reflects the growing excitement about large jackpots relative to smaller 
ones.
2  “Advertised jackpot” and “advertised jackpot squared” have been included in past 
academic articles such as DeBoer (1990), Shapira and Venezia (1992), Gulley and Scott (1993), 
Scott and Gulley (1995), Matheson (2001), and Forrest, et al, (2002), as primary explanatory 
variables for a lottery draw’s sales. 
A time trend variable is also included to account for the declining popularity in lottery 
products after they are introduced to the market.  This phenomenon has also been examined in 
the literature by DeBoer (1990).  For lotteries that have drawings twice a week (which is all of 
the lotteries examined in this paper), two separate regressions will be used as there is a distinct 
difference in the relationship between advertised jackpot levels and sales for drawings that 
involve sales of tickets over weekends versus those that only involve weekday drawings.  This 
“day” effect for lotteries has been examined more closely in DeBoer (1990), among others. 
The data used to estimate equation (1) are drawing by drawing sales for the lotto games 
of three individual state lottery associations that became members of either the Multi-State 
                                                 
1The exception to this rule comes from fact that if two or more tickets share the winning 
numbers, the jackpot prize is split among the winners. If the number of ticket buyers rises more 
rapidly than the jackpot, then the expected return may actually fall despite the larger grand-prize. 
This type of occurrence, known as “Lotto Fever,” has been examined by Matheson and Grote 
(2004) and has been found to be exceedingly rare. Even on those rare occasions of “Lotto 
Fever,” the excitement of extraordinarily high advertised jackpots entices the additional purchase 
of lottery tickets despite the lower expected value of the ticket. 
2 Note that the increasing sales relative to jackpots can either be explained by the same number 
of ticket buyers buying more tickets as jackpots rise or by more ticket buyers purchasing tickets 
as the higher jackpots increase expected returns enough to attract them to the market.   11
Lottery Association (Powerball) or the multi-state Mega Millions game after they had operated 
as an independent lottery game. The three states and the dates they joined the multi-state games 
are Colorado (joined Powerball in 2001), New Jersey (joined Big Game/Mega Millions in 1999), 
and Ohio (joined Mega Millions in 2002). These three states were chosen for the availability of 
data as well as three other factors. First, each state added a multi-state game without making 
significant changes to their own state game at that time so that sales data for their state game are 
comparable before and after the addition of the multi-state game. Second, each state provided 
sufficient lotto sales data both before and after the adoption of the multi-state game to produce 
credible results. Finally, each state provided both sales data for their own state game as well as 
the sales within their own state for the multi-state game. Summary statistics for the three selected 
state lotto games are shown in Table 1. 
The results of the regression analyses for equation (1) are provided in Table 2. All of the 
regressions showed significant evidence of positive first-order serial correlation so the variables 
used have been adjusted using the Cochrane-Orcutt process to diminish that effect.  The Durbin-
Watson statistics of the original regressions and the rho values used to adjust the variables are 
included at the bottom of the tables. 
  The coefficients on the “Multi-state” dummy variables in Table 2 indicate that for each 
state lotto game considered, there is a statistically significant decline in sales for the state’s own 
lotto game after it joins the multi-state game.  In fact, the average sales for the each state game 
fell by at least 50% after the state began offering the multi-state game.  This decline occurs even 
though the average jackpots for those same states have either remained the same or increased 
over those same time periods.   12
While state lotto sales fell, in each case the magnitude of the multi-state dummy variable 
is significantly smaller than the average per drawing multi-state ticket revenues for each state. As 
shown in Table 1, on a per-drawing basis, the average sales for the multi-state game were over 
$790,000 per drawing in Colorado, over $2,300,000 per drawing in New Jersey, and roughly 
$1,700,000 in Ohio.  Comparing each of these numbers to the coefficient on the multi-state 
dummy variable for each game (which predicts the marginal impact on the sales per-drawing for 
the state game), one can readily determine that even though the states are predicted to have lost 
revenue on their own game due to the presence of the multi-state game, the increases in state 
revenues due to sales of multi-state tickets were greater than those losses.  Thus, these three 
states seem to have increased overall state revenues by becoming members of the multi-state 
lottery. 
Although adding a simple dummy variable for the time period during which a state also 
belongs to a multi-state game is a very straightforward approach to determining the effect on the 
sales of the smaller state lottery game, it may not be the most appropriate model. It is possible 
that with the addition of a new game, current purchasers of tickets for a state’s own lotto game 
will not simply reduce their purchases by a fixed amount in each drawing, but will also alter their 
response to changing jackpot levels in the state game.  For example, the excitement over a $50 
million state-lotto jackpot is likely to be considerably reduced given the availability of a multi-
state lottery that routinely hits jackpots many times this size. Thus, while ticket buyers should 
still respond to rising jackpots for the smaller state-run lotto games, it may be that their responses 
will be dampened after the addition of a larger and more dynamic multi-state game.  This 
“dampening” effect can be measured by interacting the multi-state dummy variable with the   13
Jackpot and Jackpot-Squared variables in the regression analysis. The second equation used to 
estimate the effect of a multi-state games on state lotto ticket sales is shown in equation (2). 
 
(2) Sales  =  β0 + β1(JP) + β2(JP)
2 + β3(Trend) + β4(MS) + β4(MS x JP) + β5(MS x JP)
2 + є 
  
The regression results for equation (2) including this interaction effect are shown in Table 
3. Once the dampening effect is included, an interesting result is revealed.  For each state where 
the coefficient for the multi-state dummy variable is significantly different from zero, that 
coefficient is positive, not negative as was observed in Table 1.  However, as the advertised 
jackpot for the state’s lotto game increases, there is a significantly smaller increase in sales 
dollars (indicated by the negative sign on both of the interaction slope dummies) for every dollar 
added to the jackpot after the state joins a multi-state game.  For example, in Wednesday 
drawings of the Colorado Lotto, prior to the introduction of Powerball, an increase in the jackpot 
from $1 million to $2 million increased ticket sales by about $161 thousand; however, after the 
introduction of the multi-state game the same increase in the jackpot would only increase ticket 
sales by about $30 thousand. At higher state jackpots, the resulting reductions in sales are even 
more pronounced. Similar results occur for each of the state lotteries examined and for each day 
of drawing under at least one of the two slope-dummy variables (if not both). 
Taking all three dummy variables into account, one can ascertain that the lotto jackpot 
does not need to grow very high in order for the overall effect on state ticket sales to become 
negative in the post multi-state era. For example, considering the Colorado Wednesday drawing, 
the state lotto jackpot has to grow to only $1.3 million dollars before the presence of the 
Powerball game begins to have a negative impact on Colorado’s Wednesday drawing ticket   14
sales.  Since $1.3 million dollars is just above Colorado’s minimum jackpot prize of $1 million, 
the presence of the Powerball game in Colorado is predicted to have an increasingly negative 
impact on the Wednesday drawing ticket sales for the Colorado lottery game as the state Lotto’s 
jackpot rises.  
The results presented here present evidence for “jackpot fatigue,” the phenomenon 
experienced by many lotteries that large jackpots spur less and less ticket buying over time.  
Essentially, ticket buyers appear to be responding less to the relatively smaller advertised 
jackpots for the state games and more to the changing jackpots of the multi-state games, 
indicating that the addition of a “large jackpot” multi-state game does indeed attract consumers 
away from the smaller ones. In effect, the large multi-state games are responsible for jackpot 
fatigue in smaller state games. The results in Table 3, as a whole, also result in significantly 
higher F-scores and R
2’s than the results in Table 2, although one must be careful in attributing 
too much significance to this since the variables have been adjusted for serial correlation. 
In addition, if one uses the coefficients in Table 3 to estimate what ticket sales would 
have been in the three states had they not joined the multi-state game, these predictions can be 
compared to the combined actual sales of both state and multi-state lottery tickets to determine 
the net impact on state revenues. Using only the statistically significant coefficients on the three 
dummy variables for each game, the net impact on state revenues is consistently positive for the 
three states where data is available. The predicted average bi-weekly increase in revenues from 
combined ticket sales for the two games is over $400,000 for Colorado, over $270,000 for New 
Jersey, and over $1.2 million dollars for Ohio.  These are similar outcomes to what was 
determined from the first set of regressions in Table 1:  the net effect on state revenues appears to 
be positive from the addition of the multi-state game.   15
 
Marginal Effect on State Sales from a Change in Jackpot of the Multi-State Game 
While the results of both Tables 2 and 3 show that the multi-state game attracts ticket 
buyers away from the smaller state games, indicating that the two games are likely to be 
substitutes for one another and not complements, one must be careful in interpreting the overall 
decline in the purchase of one item when another becomes available for the first time as 
indicating substitute goods. If substitutes are to be interpreted according to this manner, then 
essentially any good can be considered a substitute for any other good since consumers must 
necessarily give up the purchase of one item when they decide to purchase something new.  
After all, consumers are typically limited in their overall purchases by their income level and, if 
one expects such “substitutions” for seemingly unrelated goods, one should certainly expect it to 
happen for lottery games where consumers may limit spending on such recreational activities to 
an even smaller proportion of their overall income.  It should not be surprising, therefore, that 
consumers in the states examined did, in fact, reduce their purchases of their own state’s lottery 
tickets to buy the larger jackpot multi-state tickets with their limited incomes. 
  In order to determine whether the relationship between a state-run lotto game and its 
multi-state counterpart is one of substitutes or complements, one must do more than just consider 
the effect on sales when the state joins the multi-state game.  The economic definition of 
substitutes and complements relies on an examination of the purchases of one good as the price 
changes for another not simply the effect on the sales of one good when another good is made 
available 
  Although the prices of lottery tickets do not change, the effective price of a ticket changes 
as the lottery jackpot rises.  The equation for the effective price of a lottery ticket has been used   16
in Gulley and Scott (1993), Scoggins (1995), and Forrest, Gulley and Simmons (2000) among 
others.  It can be expressed using the equation: 
 
(3)  P = 1 – ((1/Q)(R + jQ)(1 – e
-Qp) +EVs), 
 
where P is the effective price of the ticket, Q is the number of tickets sold, R is the rollover to the 
jackpot prize pool from the previous drawing, j is the proportion of sales revenue allocated to the 
jackpot, p is the probability of a ticket winning the jackpot and EVs is the expected value of the 
smaller prizes.  The expression (1 - e
-Qp) in the formula accounts for the probability of having to 
share the jackpot with another winning ticket.  As the number of tickets sold increases, the 
probability of having to share the jackpot with another winning ticket rises.  This lowers the 
expected value of a lottery ticket purchase and, therefore, increases the effective price of a ticket. 
While the effective price of a lottery ticket will not be estimated in the current analysis, 
what is important in considering equation (3) is the relationship between the rollover term and 
the effective price:  as the rollover increases, the effective price of a ticket falls for a given level 
of sales and given odds of winning the prize(s).  Therefore, one can examine the change in the 
advertised jackpot (as a result of the rollover from the previous draw) of one game compared to 
the change in sales of the other to explore the nature of the relationship between the two games.  
If, as the jackpot increases (and the effective price falls) in one game, the draw sales in another 
rise, ceteris paribus, this is evidence that the two lotteries are complements to one another as 
ticket buyers buy more tickets in both lottery games.  If the opposite relationship holds and draw 
sales fall as the effective price in the other game decreases, the two lotteries appear to be   17
substitutes for one another as ticket buyers choose to buy more tickets in the lotto game with the 
lower effective price and less in the other. 
Since, as mentioned previously, state-by-state sales for the multi-state lotteries are not 
readily available for all states, and since no single state comprises a significant portion of total 
Powerball or Big Game/Mega-Millions sales, only the effects of multi-state lottery jackpots on 
single-state lottery sales will be tested and not vice versa. 
The data requirements to test for the effects of the multi-state jackpot on single state sales 
are different than those to test the effects of the adoption of a multi-state lottery on single state 
sales. First, it is not necessary for a state to have operated their own lotto game both before and 
after joining a multi-state game, increasing the possible number of states that could be examined. 
Second, it is important that the drawings for the state and the multi-state games occur on the 
same day. Since ticket sales data are available drawing-by-drawing and not day-by-day, if the 
multi-state lottery has different drawing days than the state game, local buyers will face two 
different multi-state jackpots over the course of the state lotto drawing period.  Powerball 
drawings occur on Wednesday and Saturday, making Colorado usable, while Big Game/Mega 
Millions occur on Tuesday and Friday, excluding New Jersey and Ohio. Fortunately, additional 
data are available for lotto games in Indiana, Missouri, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and for Hot 
Lotto, itself a multi-state game sold in eight smaller states concurrently with Powerball. 
Summary statistics for the six selected state lotto games are shown in Table 4. 
The final equation used to estimate the effect of a multi-state games on state lotto ticket 
sales is shown in equation (4). 
 
(4) Sales  =  β0 + β1(Jackpot) + β2(Jackpot)
2 + β3(Trend) + β4(PBJP) + β4(PBJP)
2 + є   18
 
where Sales is ticket sales for the state game, Jackpot is the advertised jackpot of the state game, 
and PBJP is the advertised jackpot of the multi-state Powerball game. 
  The regression results from equation (4) are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and provide 
the clearest results for understanding the relationship between a large multi-state game and a 
smaller state lotto game.  In seven of the twelve games examined, the coefficients on both the 
PBJP and PBJP-squared terms are positive with at least one of the coefficients statistically 
significant at the 10% level. In these cases, since state lotto sales rise as the Powerball jackpot 
rises (and hence the effective price of a Powerball ticket falls), the results provide clear evidence 
that the multi-state game is a complementary good to the state game. 
  In cases where the signs on the PBJP and PBJP-squared terms are different, care must be 
taken in interpreting the results. In three of the remaining five cases the positive coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5% level or above while the negative coefficient is not statistically 
significantly different from zero, so again in these cases, persuasive evidence is provided that 
Powerball is a complement to the smaller game. 
  In the final two cases, the coefficients on the two terms are both statistically significant 
but of opposite signs. In these cases, one can simply combine the effects of the two coefficients. 
For example, in the South Dakota Wednesday drawing, the coefficient on the PBJP term is 25.97 
while the coefficient on the PBJP-squared term is –0.037. At a Powerball jackpot of $50 million, 
for example, the expected sales in the South Dakota Lotto would rise by 1,206 tickets (= 25.97 x 
50 - 0.037 x 50
2), or 8.78% relative to the average sales for the South Dakota Wednesday 
drawings. For the South Dakota Wedensday drawing, the net effect of PBJP and PBJP-squared 
are positive for all Powerball jackpots less than $700 million, a figure nearly three times larger   19
than any Powerball jackpot yet observed. Again, the multi-state game is shown to be a 
complement to the state game over the range of observed Powerball jackpots. 
   In the Wisconsin Lotto Saturday drawing there is a negative and significant Jackpot term 
for Powerball, but a positive and significant Jackpot-squared term for Powerball.  Using similar 
reasoning, this indicates the multi-state game is a substitute at lower Powerball jackpots, but as 
that jackpot rises to higher levels (of roughly $100 million or more), the relationship becomes 
one of complements. Overall, the combined results of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide strong evidence 
that a large multi-state lottery game tends to be a complement to a smaller state games, attracting 
more buyers to both games as its jackpot increases. 
  While this may seem to contradict the evidence for substitution effects when the multi-
state game is new introduced in the previous sets of results, indeed the results of all three models 
are consistent with one another.  As stated above, in order for two goods to be substitutes, one 
does not consider the overall effect on sales when a new product is introduced to a market.  
Rather one considers the sales of one good as the price changes on the other. A rising multi-state 
lottery jackpot results in a lower effective price of a multi-state lottery ticket, and, as is observed 
in eleven of the twelve lottery games examined, there is a positive and statistically significant 
impact on sales of a state’s lottery tickets as the effective price of a Powerball ticket falls.  This is 
evidence of complementary goods in those eleven lottery games.  In the remaining game, the two 
games were complements for one another over some, but not all, Powerball jackpot levels. 
 
Section IV:  Conclusions 
  There is little doubt that smaller state-run games lose ticket buyers when a state joins a 
multi-state lottery association. Furthermore, following the introduction of a multi-state game,   20
ticket buyers within a state become less responsive to changes in the state lotto game leading to 
“jackpot fatigue.” However, since the proceeds from both types of games stay within the state 
that sells the tickets, this should not be the only or even the primary consideration when states 
decide to become a part of a multi-state game. The evidence suggests that the combined ticket 
sales of the state and multi-state game rise when a multi-state game is introduced. A final issue is 
how ticket buyers react to changes in the effective price of the larger lottery when they make 
their ticket buying decisions for the smaller one.  Evidence in this paper tends to show that the 
complementary effects of the two games tend to dominate in eleven of the twelve games 
considered.  In the only game where it appears there are substitution effects, this occurs only at 
lower jackpot levels, but then the games become complements at higher jackpot levels for the 
multi-state game.  
What this means for states that run their own lottery games is twofold.  First, the state 
indeed benefits overall from belonging to a multi-state game even if the smaller state-run game 
sees a gross decline in sales as a result.  Second, state lottery associations need to, and often do, 
promote the larger games as much as possible in their advertising efforts to attract buyers to the 
ticket realtors in the first place. Once there, it appears that ticket buyers tend to take advantage of 
the opportunity of participating in the smaller state game in addition to their purchases of the 
multi-state game ticket.  Indeed, states may wish to take advantage of the frenzy created by the 
large jackpots touted by multi-state games by offering other complementary products that can 
“piggy-back” on the success of Powerball or the Big Game/Mega-Millions lottery.    21
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Data used in first two regression models 
 
 Dates  Number  of  Mean  Minimum  Maximum Mean  Minimum Maximum  Mean 
Lottery  Game  Covered  Observations Sales Sales Sales  Jackpot*  Jackpot*  Jackpot*  MS  Sales 
                
Pre  Multi-state:                
Colorado  7/14/90 - 8/4/01  1151 1,245,818 528,779 9,297,945  3.98 1.5 27 
New Jersey  7/3/95 - 5/24/99  407 3,189,415 1,306,790 21,770,479  5.48 2 35 
Ohio  1/12/91 - 5/15/02  1182 3,817,820 1,014,356 19,291,293  11.36 4 75 
                
Post  Multi-state:                
Colorado  8/8/01 - 6/19/04  299 459,566 265,292 1,000,848  3.85 1 16 790,516
New Jersey  5/27/99 - 6/21/04  530 1,576,863 855,338 6,553,945  9.02 2 48.5 2,330,984
Ohio  5/18/02 - 6/26/04  220 1,485,420 995,565 3,005,028  11.85 4 37 1,704,523
                
* Numbers are in millions of dollars.                 23
Table 2: Presence of Multi-State Game 1 
 
        Colorado        Colorado    New Jersey    New Jersey          Ohio          Ohio  
Variable Weds  Sat  Mon  Thurs  Weds  Sat 









































         (-6.72)       (-7.58)        (-5.27)         (-3.77)       (-4.99)     (-5.23)
 
N                723                  725                467               468               699            701 
R-square             0.869             0.855               0.64            0.535            0.850         0.839 








DW              0.979            1.109            1.367            1.425            1.317          1.348 
Rho              0.51            0.445            0.316            0.287            0.341          0.326 
 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is the respective t-score for that coefficient. 
**Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5% level   24
Table 3: Presence of Multi-State Game 2 
 
           Colorado  Colorado  New Jersey  New Jersey  Ohio  Ohio  Texas  Texas 


















































 (2.44)  (0.08) (3.81) (1.79) (3.45) (4.71) (4.83) (3.32)


















 (-4.26)  (-7.17) (-5.79) (-22.88) (-2.74) (-1.30) (-6.36) (-9.19)
  
N                    723                725           467             468            699            701           612           612 
R-square                  0.931             0.928        0.917          0.956         0.902         0.896         0.927         0.916 










DW                 1.174             1.236        1.224           1.068          1.505          1.595         1.302         1.318 
Rho                 0.412             0.381        0.388           0.466              0.247         0.203         0.344         0.335 
 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is the respective t-score for that coefficient. 
**Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5% level   25
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Data used in third regression model 
 
 Dates  Number  of  Mean  Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Lottery Game  Covered  Observations Sales  Sales  Sales  Jackpot* Jackpot* Jackpot* 
             
Colorado Weds  8/8/01 - 6/16/04 150  438,533 265,292 854,093 3.78 1 16
Colorado Sat  8/4/01 - 6/19/04 150  481,694 326,582 1,000,848 3.93 1 15
Hot Lotto Weds  4/10/02 - 7/7/04 117  246,116 180,665 492,400 2.12 1 6.02
Hot Lotto Sat  4/13/02 - 7/10/04 117  256,560 184,382 529,264 2.11 1 6.23
Indiana Weds   2/18/98 - 6/16/04 330  580,062 387,329 1,761,575 6.87 1 40
Indiana Sat  2/21/98 - 6/19/04 330  846,279 552,098 2,387,287 6.85 1 42
Missouri Weds  1/3/96 - 5/19/99 176  267,580 202,292 492,348 2.72 1 11.6
Missouri Sat  1/6/96 - 5/22/99 176  312,236 214,441 552,508 2.71 1 11.3
South Dakota Weds  7/3/96 - 6/23/04 414  13,739 4,691 35,208 0.06 0.02 0.34
South Dakota Sat  7/6/96 - 6/26/04 414  15,783 9,014 36,003 0.07 0.02 0.33
Wisconsin Weds  6/21/95 - 6/16/04 469  221,282 142,339 1,466,579 3.98 1 18.5
Wisconsin Sat  6/17/95 - 6/19/04 470  242,850 156,938 1,887,161 4.01 1 20.3
             
* Numbers are in millions of dollars.                 26
Table 5.1: Effect of Changing Multi-State Jackpot 
 
  Colorado  Colorado  Hot Lotto  Hot Lotto  Indiana  Indiana 
Variable  Weds  Sat Weds Sat Weds Sat 








       (20.24)        (21.54)      (13.04) (15.47)    (30.61)      (33.82)
Jackpot 35,760
** 35,881
**      -292.7 -3,998 14,622
** 14,333
**
        (13.04)         (7.07)         (-0.05) (-0.44)    (11.29)         (9.03)
Jackpot





         (-1.08)          (-0.66)        (7.11) (5.83)      (9.23)        (11.00)
Time -362.9
** -862.3
**          -14.24 -131.9 -451.4
** -1,289
**
         (-4.24)        (-5.88)         (-0.11) (-1.17)     (-5.95)       (-10.08)
PB Jackpot          62.31        -143.82        -24.51 -90.16      353.8
*        245.6
            (0.47)         (-0.68)         (-0.49) (-0.77)      (2.21)          (1.25)
PB Jackpot
2 2.104
**            2.266
**              1.157
** 1.206
*            4.230
** 3.634
**
           (3.45)        (2.65)        (5.31) (2.04)     (6.05)          (3.97)
 
N                150              150               117  117           330               330 
R-square             0.905            0.801            0.872  0.77        0.965            0.853 








DW             0.517            1.102             0.401  0.798          0.65            0.465 
Rho             0.732            0.432            0.769  0.523        0.675               0.76 
 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is the respective t-score for that coefficient. 
**Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5% level   27
Table 5.2: Effect of Changing Multi-State Jackpot 
 
  Missouri  Missouri  South Dakota  South Dakota  Wisconsin  Wisconsin 
Variable  Weds  Sat Weds Sat  Weds Sat 













**     -6,045
* -9,058
**
             (7.72)          (7.23)         (9.12)        (14.65)         (-2.12)           (-3.25)
Jackpot
2            -41.17          62.71    15,593    -40,188 2,020
** 2,227
**








             (-4.22)        (-6.50)      (-12.67)        (-2.68)        (-3.23)        (-3.44)
PB Jackpot  423.5
**       273.6
†           25.97
**           4.729         283.5
* -1,022
**
             (3.39)         (1.84)      (10.74)          (1.13)          (2.16)        (-7.20)
PB Jackpot
2               0.455           0.324          -0.037
* 0.060
**            1.033
† 10.06
**
              (0.80)           (0.31)      (-2.44)         (3.05)          (1.88)        (13.85)
 
N                   176                 176                414                414                469               470 
R-square                0.785              0.777             0.711             0.784             0.645            0.785 
Adj. R-square                0.779                0.77             0.707             0.781             0.641            0.783 
F 124.1






DW                0.877              0.898             0.456            0.293             0.948            0.892 
Rho                 0.56              0.551               0.77              0.85             0.526            0.554 
 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is the respective t-score for that coefficient. 
**Significant at 1% level 
*Significant at 5% level 
†Significant at 10% level 
 